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CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY AND SPEECH:
ERODING THE BEDROCK PRINCIPLES
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
by Chrysta Osborn
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1972, the Supreme Court declared that all constitutionally protected
speech must be treated equally. ' Above all else, the Court opined, gov-
ernment should not limit speech because of its content. 2 The principle of
equality of speech serves the important purposes of fostering self-govern-
ment, 3 and aiding citizens in their search for self-fulfillment 4 and truth. 5
Since 1972, many Supreme Court decisions have begun to erode the prin-
ciple of equality of speech. 6 When reviewing a regulation, the Court scruti-
nizes the regulation using various factors, such as the strength of the
governmental interest, to determine the constitutionality of the regulation.
Post-1972 decisions have created a scrutiny structure that differentiates be-
tween acts of speech based upon content, resulting in unequal treatment of
strikingly similar speech.7 This scrutiny structure conflicts with the princi-
ple of equality,8 a bedrock principle of the First Amendment.9 The scrutiny
structure also detracts from the learnability of First Amendment law' 0 and
has a "chilling effect" on important acts of speech."I These adverse effects
become even greater when considered in light of the recent surge in First
Amendment activity by both Congress and the Court.' 2
1. Police Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
2. Id
3. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)
(discussed infra note 22 and accompanying text).
4. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966)
(discussed infra note 25 and accompanying text).
5. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20,
25 (1975).
6. Most notably, see Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), in which the
Court delivered a famous quote declaring that pornographic films are inherently entitled to
lesser constitutional protection. See infra note 51.
7. See infra notes 92-265 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the principle of equality, see infra notes 13-29 and accompanying
text.
9. See Karst, supra note 5, at 21 (recognizing that the equality principle lies at the heart
of First Amendment protection of speech).
10. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 37.
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II. EQUALITY, LEARNABILITY AND "CHILLING EFFECTS"
A. Fundamental Values in First Amendment Law
The principle of equality of speech lies at the heart of First Amendment
protection.1 3 The equality principle embraces the concept that the govern-
ment may not regulate speech because of its content or viewpoint. 14 The
Court announced adherence to this principle in the 1972 case of Police De-
partment of the City of Chicago v. Mosley. 15
In Mosley, the Court considered the constitutionality of an ordinance that
prohibited picketing within 150 feet of a school during school hours. The
ordinance contained an exception for peaceful labor dispute picketing. The
Court struck down the ordinance because, due to the exception, the ordi-
nance denied equal protection of the law.16 In so doing, the Court firmly
established the link between equality of speech and the First Amendment. 17
The equality principle announced in Mosley strikes first and foremost at reg-
ulations that discriminate based on content.18 The Court announced its
decision to apply the strictest scrutiny to such regulations. 19 Under such
scrutiny, the government must prove that the regulation furthers a signifi-
cant governmental interest. 20
Embodied in the Mosley language are two rationales for upholding equal-
ity of speech under the First Amendment. 21 First, speech acts must be pro-
tected equally in order to aid citizens in making informed decisions about
self-government.22 Only by a free exchange of ideas can the populace edu-
cate itself and decide the proper course of action.23 Second, equality of
speech allows people to achieve self-fulfillment by expressing their own
unique viewpoints and ideas. 24 Professor Emerson advocated the concept of
13. Karst, supra note 5, at 21.
14. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
15. Id. Although the Court hinted at the principle of equality of speech in decisions as
early as Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953) and Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 272 (1951), the Court did not expressly embrace the principle until Mosley. See
Karst, supra note 5, at 26 n.33.
16. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 102.
17. Karst, supra note 5, at 28.
18. In Mosley the Court declared that the foremost principle of First Amendment protec-
tion of speech meant that the government "has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its idea, its subject matter, or its content.... [t]he essence of this forbidden censor-
ship is content control .... " Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96.
19. Id. at 98. For a thorough discussion of the case, see Karst, supra note 5, at 26-29.
20. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98.
21. In Mosley the Court supported the principle of equality, reasoning that equality was
necessary "[to] permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-
fulfillment for each individual ..... Id. at 95. For a discussion of the purposes behind equality
of speech, see Karst, supra note 5, at 23-26.
22. Alexander Meiklejohn advocated the self-government purpose of equality in FREE
SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT, supra note 3. Meiklejohn viewed free
speech as important to the concept of self-government because the wisdom required for in-
formed choices about government can only be found in the minds of the people, and that
wisdom is enhanced by knowledge of all of the alternatives brought to light by free speech.
Meiklejohn, supra note 3, at 19, 26-28.
23. Id.
24. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
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self-fulfillment in his "general theory" of the First Amendment.25 Similarly,
Professor Karst reflected that self-fulfillment stems from being able to ex-
press one's views as a fully participating citizen in democratic self-
government.26
Scholars advance other purposes than those set forth in Mosley to support
the equality of First Amendment speech. 27 These purposes include the need
for free speech in the search for truth, 28 and free speech as a method of
instilling the value of tolerance in the citizenry. 29
Scholars also value learnability when discussing the system of First
Amendment analysis. 30 Learnability requires that the Court articulate the
system of analysis clearly and consistently, so that practitioners, judges, and
laymen may understand the concept of First Amendment rights. 3 1 Those
who must apply the analysis must be capable of doing so correctly in order
for the system to work satisfactorily. 32
Finally, the Court must attend to the "chilling effects" of regulations
under the system of analysis it adopts. Regulation of speech, even when
merely contemplated, has a chilling effect on the proscribed speech. 33 The
recent Helms Amendment exemplifies the chilling effect of governmental
regulation. Senator Helms introduced an amendment to ban the use of fed-
eral money to fund obscene or indecent art, in reaction to two exhibitions
funded by the National Endowment for the Arts. 34 Because of the legisla-
tion, a prominent art gallery decided to cancel the showing of one of the
25. Emerson, supra note 4; see Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimina-
tion, 68 VA. L. REv. 203, 209-11 (1982).
26. Karst, supra note 5, at 26.
27. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
28. Karst, supra note 5, at 26.
29. L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSrrrUTIONAL LAW 793 n.23 (1988).
30. The concept of learnability is discussed more thoroughly in the context of the particu-
lar problems of the scrutiny structure, infra notes 85-87, 136-44 and accompanying text.
31. Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REv. 265, 305-07 (1981). Schauer recognized that one might make two inquiries of any system
of analysis: first, is the system good or bad; and second, can people learn it. Id. at 306. To
some extent, these principles compete. Id. at 306.
Were we not concerned with learnability, we would attempt to fashion a com-
plex code enabling us to deal adequately with all of the variations presented by
particular cases. Every relevant and justifiable distinction, no matter how fine,
would be built into the code .... Certain very complex codes break down
because ordinary people just can't keep all the distinctions, caveats, and excep-
tions straight in their heads."
Id. (quoting Trianowsky, Rule-Utilitarianism and the Slippery Slope, 75 J. PHIL. 414, 421
(1978)).
32. Schauer, supra note 31, at 305-06.
33. "Chilling effects" are usually discussed in conjunction with the overbreadth doctrine,
see Tribe, supra note 29, at 1033-35, but the principle that people will be intimidated from
exercising their right to speak applies whenever the effects of a regulation are unknown. Id. at
1034.
34. The issue of subsidies and First Amendment analysis is a new problem. Until re-
cently, the only First Amendment questions concerned regulations, not subsidies. This prob-
lem is discussed in Emerson, The State of the First Amendment As We Enter "1984" in
FREEDOM AT RISK 43 (C. Curry ed. 1988).
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exhibits that prompted the furor.35 Consequently, artists and patrons alike
picketed and boycotted the gallery.36 In the words of one of the boycotting
artists, "[t]he Corcoran has been chilled." '37
B. Criticism of the Equality Principle: Equality v. Subclassification
Not all writers agree that equality of speech and content neutrality should
be guiding principles of the First Amendment.38 Stephan argues that the
concept of absolute content neutrality is wholly impractical, because such a
premise is "antithetical to rational analysis" of free speech questions. 39 The
basic hypothesis underlying Stephan's argument is that a natural common-
sense hierarchy of speech exists, which is based on the underlying values of
different types of speech. 4° Stephan argues that the concept of equality is
misguided because, in its absolute form, equality fails to recognize this hier-
archy.41 Thus, a strict interpretation of equality makes it impossible to dis-
tinguish protected speech from unprotected speech, or commercial speech
from noncommercial speech. 42 Such categories are intuitively entitled to dif-
ferent levels of protection.43
The scholars supporting equality of speech advocate equality for all pro-
tected speech, but admit the necessity of distinguishing protected from un-
protected speech.44 Where equality proponents disagree with those who
advocate a classification system, however, is on the issue of whether the
court should make further subclassifications of speech depending upon con-
tent.45 Subclassification detracts from the equality principle by classifying
and treating speech differently based on content.46 In addition, subclassifica-
tion risks oversuppression of speech because where the subcategory bounda-
35. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1989, at 111; see also U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Sept. 25, 1989,
at 22.
36. Id.
37. A discussion of the scrutiny structure's effects on equality, learnability, and "chilling
effects" on free speech, is made timely by more than just the Helms Amendment. Congress
has undertaken major legislation in the First Amendment arena, both with the Helms Amend-
ment, supra note 34-35, and the flag burning statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (West Supp. 1990).
Not only has Congress been active; the Supreme Court has decided several major First
Amendment cases in the past year. Cases like Texas v. Johnson, U.S. 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105
L.Ed.2d 342 (1989)(flag burning)(discussed infra notes 128-44 and accompanying text), Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, U.S. 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989)(inde-
cency and obscenity)(discussed infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text), and Board of
Trustees v. Fox, U.S. 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 2.Ed.2d 388 (1989)(commercial speech)(discussed
infra notes 178-187 and accompanying text) will have long-lasting effects on First Amendment
analysis. With heightened levels of First Amendment activity in both Congress and the Court,
the inconsistencies of scrutiny anaylsis must be corrected and the accompanying adverse af-
fects on free speech halted.
38. See Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 Va. L. Rev. 203
(1982)
39. Id. at 206.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 211.
42. Id. at 211-12.
43. Id. at 206.
44. Schauer, supra note 31, at 286-88.
45. Stephan, supra note 38, at 212-13; Schauer, supra note 31, at 282-86.
46. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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ries are unclear, scholars fear the court will give speech less protection.47
The system of subclassification has three primary advantages. First, if
courts try to establish absolute equality for all speech, or even all protected
speech, courts may leave too much speech unprotected in an effort to leave
troublesome categories outside First Amendment protection.48 Second, dif-
ferent types of speech may require different analyses. The tests developed
for one type of speech are not easily applied to other categories of speech.4 9
Third, it seems intuitively correct to classify speech. 50 The general populace
believes that commonsense distinctions between types of speech exist and
that some classes of speech are entitled to more protection than others. 51
The problem arises when one person's commonsense categories do not coin-
cide with another person's. 52
The Court has not settled the debate between equality and subclassifica-
tion.53 While repeating the principle of equality in First Amendment analy-
sis, the Court still creates a myriad of subclassifications. 54 In Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission 55 the Court reaffirmed the principle
of equality. 56 The Court determined that when regulations proscribe an en-
tire topic, or proscribe only viewpoints, strict scrutiny applies. 57 In Consoli-
dated Edison the Court actually expanded the principle of equality by
enlarging the pool of regulations subjected to strict scrutiny.58
More recently, in Boos v. Barry59 the Court upheld the expansion of the
equality principle set forth in Consolidated Edison.60 In Boos, the Court
struck down a law that prohibited picketing in front of foreign embassies
when the picketing would tend to bring the foreign officials into discredit. 6 1
The Court, once again, based the decision to apply strict scrutiny on the
principle of equality and the "First Amendment's hostility to content based
47. Schauer, supra note 31, at 290.
48. Id. at 286.
49. Id. at 287.
50. Id.
51. In Young v. American Mini-Theatres, the Court said:
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to
despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend
the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Ac-
tivities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice.
427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). See Schauer, supra note 31, at 288.
52. Schauer, supra note 31, at 288.
53. See text accompanying notes 55-76.
54. Id.
55. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
56. Id. at 537.
57. Id. With the Consolidated Edison decision, the Court ended the debate on whether
regulations based on subject matter should be analyzed using content-based scrutinies. Before
the decision, scholars considered a regulation content-based only if the regulation proscribed
the entire topic, and not merely one subject falling within the topic. For a synopsis of the
debate prior to the decision, see Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A
Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980).
58. Schauer, supra note 31, at 288.
59. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
60. Id. at 329.
61. Id.
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regulations." 62
Although at times espousing a concept of equality,63 the Court seemingly
contradicts that principle in other cases. In Young v. American Mini-Thea-
tres" the Court declared that few would go to war to protect pornographers'
rights to free speech. 65 That famous quote goes a long way towards breaking
down the equality of speech. 66 The Court openly recognized a hierarchy of
speech and declared that some speech is entitled to less protection.67 Cases
like Young, which doctrinally contradict the equality principle, lie inter-
spersed between those that uphold the principle.
C. The Scrutiny Structure and Erosion of the Equality Principle
The more disturbing threat to the equality principle comes not from what
the Court has said openly, but what the Court has done subtly. 68 The
Court's application of different scrutinies to various types of speech is dis-
turbing because it creates a myriad of subclassifications, all of which erode
the equality principle. This Comment focuses on the subtle misapplication
of scrutinies69 and the subsequent effects on the equality principle.70
In order to understand the misapplication of scrutinies, one must under-
stand the decision tree structure that the Court uses to scrutinize a regula-
tion.7 1 First, the Court classifies the regulation as content-neutral or
content-based.72 Within the content-based regulations, the Court applies
62. Id. at 319. Curiously, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection
clause, even though that ruling was not essential. Id. at 334. Perhaps the Court wanted to
dissolve the link between the equality principles embedded in the First Amendment, and those
found in the Equal Protection clause because of the different analytical structures the Court
employs in the two areas of constitutional law.
63. Most recently the Court upheld the principle in U.S. v. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. 4744,
4776 (June 11, 1990).
64. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
65. Id at 68.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
69. One might argue that the Court has not misapplied the scrutinies, but rather has
applied them purposely in order to achieve the Court's desired results. To the extent the
scrutiny application detracts from the First Amendment principles espoused by the Court,
however, the Court has misapplied the scrutinies.
70. For a thorough discussion of scrutinies throughout constitututional law, see Gallo-
way, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 449. Gallo-
way notes the three basic components that comprise most scrutinies: (1) scrutiny of
government interests; (2) scrutiny of the effectiveness of the means chosen to further the gov-
ernment interests; and (3) scrutiny of alternatives to determine whether less restrictive meth-
ods are available for furthering the government interests. Id. at 450. Galloway also groups
scrutinies into three levels: rationality review, the lowest level of scrutiny; intermediate scru-
tiny, which is a moderately strong review of the regulation; and intense scrutiny, which is the
most rigorous scrutiny the courts apply. Id. at 451-56. Galloway perceives that the problems
with constitutional scrutinies include confusion concerning the conceptual structure of the
scrutinies, poor articulation of the various scrutinies, and overlap between the scrutinies. Id
at 462-90. This comment gives particular attention to the confusion concerning the conceptual
structure of the scrutinies used in First Amendment law.
71. See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
72. Tribe depicts the classification of a regulation as content-neutral or content-based as
the two tracks of First Amendment law. Tribe, supra note 29, at 791-92.
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different scrutinies to regulations dealing with commercial, noncommercial,
and unprotected speech.73 On the other branch of the tree lie the content-
neutral scrutinies. The Court further breaks down content-neutral regula-
tions into forum-based regulations, and regulations affecting combined
speech and conduct. 74 Upon deciding how to classify a regulation, the
Court applies the appropriate scrutiny. The scrutiny structure shown in the
diagram below encompasses each of these classifications, and provides the
basic scrutiny for each type of regulation.
Two disturbing facets of the scrutiny structure have evolved through
Supreme Court case law. 75 First, the Court defines the scrutinies inconsis-
tently.76 Even after the Court classifies a regulation and chooses a type of
scrutiny, the regulation is not assured treatment equal to that afforded other
similarly grouped regulations. 77 Wide discrepancies exist in the Court's
enunciation of each individual scrutiny, creating creating a myriad of sub-
classifications that degrade the principle of equality.78 This Comment dis-
cusses these "micro" 79 scrutiny structure inconsistencies in Section III.80
Second, the Court has made bizarre choices in its analysis, classifying con-
tent-neutral regulations as content-based, and vice versa."' Through such
inconsistent classification, the Court has degraded the principle of equality,
not only treating different speech differently, but also treating strikingly sim-
ilar speech differently.82 The problems stemming from the "macro" scrutiny
structure are discussed in Section IV.8 3
D. Practical Difficulties: Learnability and "Chilling Effects"
The Court's inconsistent scrutiny structure not only erodes the equality
73. See infra notes 94-196.
74. See infra notes 199-265.
75. The first facet, inconsistent articulation of the scrutinies, is discussed infra notes 92-
265 and accompanying text. The second facet, inconsistent classification of regulations, is dis-
cussed infra notes 266-329 and accompanying text.
76. See infra note 77.
77. Compare, for example, the different scrutinies used for noncommercial speech regula-
tions, which should all receive the same strict scrutiny. In Consolidated Edison Co., Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), the Court applied the scrutiny of "a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling state interest." Id. at 540. In Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312 (1988), the Court required that the regulation be necessary to serve a state interest and
that it be narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Id. at 321. These two scrutinies do not imply
the same level of review. Other cases differ even more substantially from the Consolidated
scrutiny. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (198 1)(plurality opinion).
These cases and others are discussed thoroughly infra notes 94-144 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 92-265 and accompanying text.
79. One author has used "macro" and "micro" as terms in First Amendment analysis in
the context of government subsidies and speech. See Curry, supra note 34, at 43.
80. See infra notes 92-265 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 275-317 and accompanying text.
82. The Court has eroded its purported dedication to equality by using the major classifi-
cations on the decision tree. These major classifications contribute to the principles of
learnability and help stem "chilling effects," however, and should therefore be retained. See
infra notes 330-42 and accompanying text. In any case, it seems a settled principle that the
Court will engage in such classification. See Tribe, supra note 29, at 791-92.
















principle, but also presents two practical hardships.8 4 First, the inconsisten-
cies in the current system of scrutinies render the system unlearnable8 5 The
system is formulated too inarticulately and subtly for practitioners and
judges to comprehend.8 6 If the system were understandable, scholars would
make fewer attempts to formulate a coherent concept of the First
Amendment.8 7
Second, the scrutiny structure problems allow regulations to survive scru-
tiny more easily, thereby increasing their "chilling effects."8 8 Also, because
the system is unlearnable, people can never predict the constitutionality of a
proposed regulation.8 9 When in doubt, people will probably curtail their
speech, presuming that the government acts legitimately. 9° This Comment
discusses the practical problems of learnability and "chilling effects" in light
of the individual scrutiny problems.91
III. MICRO STRUCTURE INCONSISTENCIES
In theory, after classifying the regulation on the decision tree and choos-
ing the applicable scrutiny,92 the Court enunciates the scrutiny and applies it
to the regulation. The five basic scrutinies are grouped into content-based
and content-neutral scrutinies. Content-based scrutinies tend to be more
stringent than content-neutral scrutinies, but wide variations in the five basic
scrutinies can be readily identified from the case law.93
A. Content-Based Scrutinies: Noncommercial Speech
When the Court decides that a regulation focuses on the content of the
speech in question and the speech is noncommercial in nature,94 the Court
applies the "most exacting scrutiny" 95 to evaluate the constitutionality of the
regulation. The basic scrutiny requires that the regulation be a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling state interest. 96 The Court, however,
has applied other formulations.9 7 The Court makes a strong presumption of
84. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
85. For a discussion of learnability, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
86. See infra note 87.
87. Schauer noted the countless law review articles on the concept of First Amendment
analysis, stating that "[i]t is in no way my intention to build a new theory of the first amend-
ment. We have too many of those already." Schauer, supra note 31, at 266. Schauer also
noted that "every third article or student note in every other issue of any law review selected at
random" attempts to build a new theory of First Amendment analysis. Likewise, this author
does not intend to be nearly so bold as to formulate a First Amendment theory in a student
comment, but merely to raise some important points about the erosion of existing principles by
the use of poorly applied scrutinies.
88. See infra notes 299-317 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 92-329 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 92-329 and accompanying text.
92. For a discussion of the decision tree, see supra text p. 107.
93. See infra notes 94-265 and accompanying text.
94. See supra page 1019 for the decision tree structure.
95. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
96. Consolidated Edison Co., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
97. See infra notes 99-144 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutionality when applying this most exacting scrutiny, because non-
commercial speech is the most highly valued form of speech under the
Constitution.9"
1. Consolidated Edison: The Basic Noncommercial Scrutiny
The Court enunciated the basic noncommercial scrutiny in Consolidated
Edison Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission.99 At issue was the constitu-
tionality of a Public Service Commission (PSC) regulation prohibiting utility
companies from inserting public policy materials into customer billing enve-
lopes. Consolidated Edison distributed pamphlets supporting nuclear power
but refused to distribute pamphlets from an organization opposed to nuclear
power. In response, the PSC passed a regulation to protect the customers'
privacy from being subjected to the utility's political views. The Court
struck down the regulation, finding that the it was not a precisely drawn
means of serving a compelling state interest.10°
The Court explained that the interest in protecting the consumers' privacy
would meet the "compelling" requirement only if the pamphlets invaded
that privacy in an essentially intolerable manner. 10 1 Because consumers
could merely discard the material, the situation was not constitutionally in-
tolerable. 102 By defining compelling to mean intolerable, the Court applied
the most exacting scrutiny. 103 Consolidated Edison exemplifies both the ba-
sic scrutiny and the Court's predisposition to strike down a content-based,
noncommercial speech regulation.)4
2. Metromedia: Abandoning the Consolidated Test
The Court applied a substantially different scrutiny in Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego.10 5 The Court did not require that the regulation precisely
98. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1981), wherein the
Court acknowledged that noncommercial speech should be accorded higher protection than
commercial speech. Although this valuation of speech cannot be reconciled with the equality
principle, the Court has decided many cases stressing the lower value of commercial speech.
Id
99. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
100. Id. at 540.
101. Id. at 542.
102. Id.
103. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (defining the scrutiny for noncommercial speech as "the
most exacting").
104. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, questioned the validity of the principle of
equality.
[E]very lawyer who has read ... our cases upholding various restrictions on
speech with specific reference to subject matter must recognize the hyperbole in
the dictum: "But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content."
Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., concurring)(quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95). Stevens went on to
conclude that, were that statement true, the Court could have summarily dismissed the regula-
tion as unconstitutional because the regulation regulated based on content, rather than an-
nouncing a detailed rejection of the state's arguments regarding its interests in protecting
consumer privacy. Id.
105. 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion).
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serve a compelling interest, as in Consolidated. Rather, the Court deter-
mined the constitutionality of the regulation based on whether the regulation
afforded at least as much protection to higher classes of speech as was af-
forded to lower classes.1°6
The regulation under scrutiny, a San Diego ordinance, prohibited all bill-
boards except those that fell within a limited number of exceptions. After
finding the regulation content-based, the Court divided its analysis into two
parts, treating separately the regulation's effect on noncommercial and com-
mercial speech.10 7 First, the Court held that the regulation passed the com-
mercial speech scrutiny.108 Then, in a "bizarre" step of logic,1 09 the Court
found the ordinance unconstitutional because it offered less protection to
noncommercial speech than it offered to commercial speech.110 The Court
thus applied a test that based the constitutionality of the ordinance on
whether it offered at least as much protection to higher categories of speech
as to lower categories.II The Metromedia test differs substantially from the
106. Id, at 515. Note that by declaring speech to be of relatively higher or lower classes,
the Court implicitly rejects the equality principle.
107. Id. at 505. The Metromedia opinion gives no basis for the Court's conclusion that the
regulation was content-based. Id. Although the Court used content-based scrutinies, one
could persuasively argue that the regulation was merely a content-neutral "time, place, or
manner" regulation because the regulation regulated all speech without making significant
distinctions based on content. Id. at 527 (Brennan, J., concurring). Although Justice Brennan
gave little support for his conclusion that the regulation was content-neutral, Brennan applied
the content-neutral scrutiny and concluded that the ordinance should still be invalidated, pri-
marily because the city failed to show a substantial interest. Id. at 528. For a discussion of
content-neutral scrutinies, see infra notes 197-265 and accompanying text.
108. 453 U.S. at 512. The Court's holding in Metromedia, as it pertains to commercial
speech, is discussed more thoroughly infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
109. Chief Justice Burger called the plurality's analysis in Metromedia bizarre. Id. at 564
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The gist of Burger's opinion is that the plurality struck the regula-
tion because the regulation did not abridge enough speech, which presented some constitu-
tional and practical problems. Id. at 569. First, Burger argued that it made no sense to strike
down a regulation because of its exceptions, which allow speech to escape regulation. Id. at
564. Burger then noted that, under the plurality's logic, the only alternatives for cities that
wished to regulate billboards would be to either ban billboards altogether or to permit all
noncommercial signs, no matter how big or how hazardous to motorists and pedestrians. Id
Neither of these alternatives properly acknowledged the "ever-increasing menace to the urban
environment." Id.
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, made similar arguments. Id. at 521-40. The
plurality had concluded that a single regulation cannot offer more protection to commercial
speech than to noncommercial speech. Id. at 513 (plurality opinion). The plurality's reason-
ing merely encouraged cities to divide their statutes in two, having separate statutes for the two
types of speech, thus eliminating the problem without really addressing the issue of constitu-
tional protection of speech. Id. at 522 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan, moreover, found
disturbing the fact that cities would thereby have substantial discretion to decide what was
commercial and noncommercial speech in order to apply the appropriate regulation. Id. at
538. Such classification forms a vital part of judicial review of speech regulations and should
not be left to the government alone. Id. at 539-40. "[I]t presents a real danger of curtailing
noncommercial speech in the guise of regulating commercial speech." Id. at 536-37.
The plurality seemed to have just as much difficulty with the other justices' opinions. Justice
White, writing for the plurality, devoted section VI of his opinion to attacking the "rhetorical
hyperbole of the Chief Justice" and reconciling it with the plurality opinion. Id. at 517-21
(plurality opinion).
110. Id. at 515.
111. The Court has repeatedly stated that commercial speech is entitled to less constitu-
1990] 1023
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
method of scrutiny that the Court employed in Consolidated Edison.112
3. Boos v. Barry: Expanding the Continuum
The Court returned to the general structure of the Consolidated Edison
scrutiny in Boos v. Barry.113 In Boos, the Court considered a regulation
making it unlawful to display any sign tending to bring a foreign government
into odium outside that government's embassy. The Court declared the reg-
ulation unconstitutional because it was not narrowly drawn to serve a com-
pelling state interest.114 Although the interest in protecting foreign officials
from public ridicule was rooted in important U.S. foreign relations policy,
the Court found that the regulation was not narrowly tailored. 15
Despite the fact that the Boos scrutiny parallels the structure of the Con-
solidated Edison test, the actual words imply a different standard of re-
view. 116 No longer must the regulation be precisely drawn;117 instead, the
regulation will pass scrutiny if narrowly tailored."" Although the Court
seemingly equates such words, 1 9 the effect is not the same.' 20
In 1989, the Court added even more variation to the scrutiny.12' In Sable
Communications, Inc. v. F C.C. 122 the Court declared unconstitutional a law
that prohibited broadcast of indecent phone messages ("dial-a-porn") be-
cause the law was not the least restrictive means available to further a com-
pelling governmental interest.' 23 The government asserted an interest in
protecting minor children from hearing indecent messages. Although recog-
nizing the interest as a compelling, 124 the Court concluded that Congress
could have restricted children's access to the messages through less restric-
tional protection than noncommercial speech, and is therefore an inferior class of protected
speech. Id at 513.
112. Not only is the scrutiny that the Court employed in Metromedia quite different, but it
obviously recognizes the lower values of certain types of speech. 453 U.S. at 513-15. This
erodes the equality principle. Even though commercial speech is repeatedly recognized as
being of lesser value than noncommercial speech, the Court has never framed a scrutiny in
terms of the hierarchy of classes of speech. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 522 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
113. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
114. Id. at 329.
115. Id. The Boos Court noted that Congress had determined that the regulation making it
unlawful to display certain signs outside a foreign government's embassy was no longer vital to
maintain compliance with the Vienna Convention, which was the legislative purpose behind
the statute. Id at 325-26.
116. See infra note 120.
117. Consolidated, 447 U.S. at 540.
118. Boos, 485 U.S. at 329.
119. See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
120. Galloway characterizes the Court's articulation of the Boos branch of the scrutiny as
careless and inconsistent. Galloway, supra note 70, at 466. The Court equates "narrowly
tailored" with "necessary," meaning the least onerous alternative for furthering the relevant
government interest. Id. at 467. Galloway contends that "precisely drawn" and "narrowly
tailored" do not convey the same meaning as "necessary," but imply a more stringent scrutiny.
See id.
121. See infra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
122. 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989).
123. 109 S.Ct. at 2839.
124. Id. at 2836.
1024 [Vol. 44
COMMENTS
tive means. 125 The Court suggested the alternative of requiring access codes
and credit cards from all callers wishing to hear the messages. 126 Exactly
where the least restrictive means test fits into the "precisely drawn" and
"narrowly tailored" continuum remains unclear. 127
4. Texas v. Johnson: Absence of a Scrutiny
In Texas v. Johnson 128 the Court seemed to abandon all variations of the
traditional Consolidated Edison scrutiny. 129 In Johnson the defendant vio-
lated a Texas statute prohibiting the desecration of venerated objects, by
burning a United States flag outside the 1984 Republican National Conven-
tion. Although the Court paid lip service to subjecting the statute to "the
most exacting scrutiny," 130 the Court never applied any scrutiny at all. 31
The Court instead focused on the nature of the state's interest in preserving
the flag as a national symbol. 132 Finding that the mere interest in preserving
the flag as a symbol amounted to a governmental decree of "what shall be
orthodox" in political thought, 133 the Court held that the asserted preserva-
tion interest violated the First Amendment's requirement that regulations be
content-neutral. 34  The Court therefore declared the statute
unconstitutional. 135
Each of these five cases articulate variations of the scrutiny applied to
content-based regulations of noncommercial speech.1 36 The Metromedia
test, requiring the regulation to offer as much protection to higher classes of
speech as it affords the speech in question, 137 patently differs from the con-
ventional strict scrutiny of Consolidated Edison.' 38 Similarly, the complete
125. Id at 2838.
126. Id at 2838-39.
127. Galloway argues that "narrowly tailored" means the least onerous alternative for fur-
thering the government interest. Galloway, supra note 70, at 467. "Least restrictive means"
certainly implies something similar. One might, therefore, conclude that "least restrictive
means" equals "narrowly tailored," but the Court has never expressed that conclusion.
128. 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989).
129. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
130. 109 S.Ct. at 2543.
131. See id. at 2544-46.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2546. Even though the Court in Johnson fails to apply a scrutiny, the Court
upholds the fundamental principle of equality of speech by striking down the statute solely on
equality principles. See id. at 2544-46. The Court had earlier hinted that the equality principle
no longer has force, by the Court's explicit recognition of the lower value of commercial
speech in Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513. The Court seems to alternately stress the equality
principle or the classification system to support the Court's holding in a particular case.
Whether these two opposing considerations can be reconciled remains to be seen, but Texas v.
Johnson clearly indicates that the equality principle has not yet died. 109 S.Ct. 2544-46.
134. 109 S.Ct at 2544-45.
135. Declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Johnson Court framed its decision almost
entirely on whether or not the regulation was content-based, see infra notes 302-08 and accom-
panying text, and the Court failed to apply the scrutiny after classifying the regulation. See
109 S.Ct. at 2544-48.
136. See supra notes 94-135 and accompanying text.
137. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515.
138. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
1990] 1025
1026 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
lack of an articulated test in Texas v. Johnson,139 the most recent of the
cases, cannot be analogized to traditional strict scrutiny.140 Even the more
subtle differences between the tests in Consolidated Edison, Boos, and Sable
Communications,14 1 create disconcerting hierarchies of scrutiny. 142 If the
Court applies different tests to different instances of purportedly equal
speech, then the speech is not truly equal.143 Such inconsistent tests, more-
over, do not promote the learnability of the scrutiny system. 144
B. Content-Based Scrutinies: Commercial Speech
When speech proposes a commercial transaction, 145 the Court applies a
less stringent scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the regulation. 146
The rationale behind applying less stringent analysis stems from the more
limited constitutional protection traditionally afforded commercial
speech. 147 In fact, prior to 1964, the First Amendment did not protect com-
mercial speech. Then, in New York Times v. Sullivan ' 4 the Court granted
commercial speech limited constitutional protection because the speech at
issue contained political overtones. 149 It was not until Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Consumer Council' 50 that the Court protected commer-
cial speech in its own right. 151 In dicta, however, the Court hinted that
commercial speech probably should receive less protection than noncom-
mercial speech.152
1. Central Hudson: The Basic Commercial Scrutiny
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 15 3
the Court first set forth the basic scrutiny for commercial speech. 154 If the
commercial speech at issue deserves protection, 155 the government must
prove that the regulation directly advances a substantial governmental inter-
139. See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
140. See discussion of Consolidated Edison, supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
142. Compare the conclusion that different formulations of the scrutiny accord different
treatment to regulations, with the language in Sable Communications, 109 S.Ct. at 2836,
wherein the Court uses "carefully tailored," "least restrictive means," and "narrowly tailored"
interchangeably.
143. See supra notes 38-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equality principle
and classification.
144. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text for the discussion of learnability.
145. Commercial speech is defined as speech which proposes a commercial transaction.
Board of Trustees, 109 S.Ct. at 3031.
146. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text for the basic commercial scrutiny.
147. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513.
148. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
149. Id. at 266.
150. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
151. Id.
152. Id at 780.
153. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
154. Id. at 566.
155. Even today, the Court does not always protect commercial speech. In order for com-
mercial speech to warrant protection, the speech must concern legal activity and must not be
misleading. Id. at 566.
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est 156 and is no more extensive than necessary to further that interest. 157
The Court used this scrutiny to strike down the Commission's order prohib-
iting the utility from promoting the use of electricity. 158 The Court found
that the regulation directly advanced the substantial interest of cutting elec-
tric consumption. 159 The regulation was not the least extensive means avail-
able to achieve the goal, however, since the regulation also prohibited the
promotion of electricity-efficient devices such as heat pumps1 6°
2. Recent Cases: Strict versus Lenient Scrutiny
The Court considerably softened its application of the Central Hudson test
in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego161 by affording extreme deference
to the city's asserted interests. 162 In Metromedia, the Court held the statute
prohibiting billboards constitutional insofar as it pertained to regulation of
commercial speech. 163 In so holding, the Court agreed with the City's asser-
tions that the regulation directly advanced substantial goals of traffic safety
and improved city appearance, without truly scrutinizing those assertions. 164
The Court found no reason to conclude that the relationship between the
regulation and the goals was "unreasonable."' 165 Merely requiring that the
regulation reasonably fit the interest constitutes a much less stringent stan-
dard than the least restrictive means analysis employed in Central
Hudson.' 16
The Court vacillated from strict to lenient applications of the commercial
speech scrutiny in the recent cases of Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,167 Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism Co. 16 and San
Francisco Arts & Athletics v. Olympic Committee.169 In Zauderer the Court
held that the Ohio disciplinary rule that prohibited the use of drawings in
legal advertisements was not the least restrictive means of furthering the
state interest in avoiding deceptive advertising.170 Thus, the Court returned
to the least restrictive means analysis contemplated in Central Hudson. 1 1
In Posadas de Puerto Rico,17 2 the Court abandoned the Central Hudson
156. Id
157. Id
158. Id. at 571.
159. Id at 568.
160. Id at 571.
161. 453 U.S. 490. For a discussion of Metromedia's holdings with regard to noncommer-
cial scrutinies, see supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
162. 453 U.S. at 509.
163. Id. at 512.
164. Id
165. Id. at 509.
166. Accord Board of Trustees, 109 S.Ct. at 3033-34 (describing the Central Hudson test as
a least restrictive means test.
167. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
168. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
169. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
170. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 644.
171. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
172. 478 U.S. 328.
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test altogether.173 At issue was a Puerto Rican law restricting the broadcast
of gambling advertisements to residents of the island. Because the govern-
ment possessed the power to eliminate gambling altogether, the Court rea-
soned that the government also possessed the lesser power to ban gambling
advertisements. 17 4
The Court returned to a more lenient scrutiny application in San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics. 75 In upholding the exclusive congressional grant of
the word "Olympic" to the Olympic Committee, the Court said that the
Central Hudson test was equivalent to the relaxed scrutiny for content-neu-
tral time, place and manner regulations.' 76 The Court thus rejected a least
restrictive means application of the test.177
3. Board of Trustees: Something Less than Least Restrictive Means
The Court appears to have settled on the more lenient application of the
scrutiny in its most recent holding, Board of Trustees v. Fox. 178 The Court
upheld a university regulation prohibiting tupperware parties in dorm
rooms, interpreting the scrutiny to "require something short of a least-re-
strictive-means standard."' 79 In so doing, the Court acknowledged that one
could read previous case discussions of the commercial speech scrutiny as
implying a least restrictive means analysis.'8 0 The Court reasoned, how-
ever, that the previous cases concerned regulations that would fail the scru-
tiny no matter how formulated.' 8 ' Any discussion of requiring the least
restrictive means for commercial speech regulations, therefore, constituted
dicta. '8 2
Although the Court concluded in Board of Trustees that this scrutiny was
less than a least restrictive means analysis, 8 3 the Court did not delineate the
exact test.'8 4 Whether the Court will merely require a reasonable connec-
tion between the means and the end, as in Metromedia, or whether the court
will revert to the Posadas analysis, where the power to ban an activity en-
compasses the power to prohibit speech concerning it, remains to be seen.
The Board of Trustees holding failed to eliminate the inconsistencies in the
commercial speech scrutiny.'85 Without an answer to the questions, the
"chilling effect" of governmental regulation will be increased.' 8 6 As long as
the inconsistencies stand, not all commercial speech will be treated equally,
173. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
174. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
175. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
176. Id. at 537 n.16.
177. Accord Board of Trustees, 109 S.Ct. at 3033. See supra text accompanying notes 178-
83.
178. 109 S.Ct. 3028.
179. Id. at 3033.
180. Id. at 3034.




185. See supra notes 153-84 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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nor will practictioners and judges be able to learn the system. 187
C. Content-Based Scrutinies: Unprotected Speech
The First Amendment fails to protect certain types of speech such as ob-
scenity, 188 defamation, 18 9 and "fighting words.' '190 The rationale behind de-
claring such speech beyond the bounds of constitutional protection is that
the speech possesses so little value as an expression of ideas that it does not
merit protection.191
The Court operates with wide discretion in declaring speech unpro-
tected. 192 After having determined that the speech is unprotected, the Court
applies a rationality scrutiny to the regulation at issue.193 Under rationality
review, the Court will not strike down the regulation if the regulation is
merely reasonably related to the state interest. 194 The Court gives great def-
erence to the government under this scrutiny. 195
Obviously, rationality scrutiny allows wide latitude in interpreting the re-
lationships of means and ends. For this reason, it would be difficult to prove
that the Court is inconsistent in applying rationality review. The rationality
scrutiny is important, however, because the Court sometimes uses rationality
in contexts where other scrutinies should apply. 196
D. Content-Neutral Scrutinies: Forum Analysis
A regulation is content-neutral if it merely attempts to regulate the time,
place or manner of speech without regard to the speaker's topic or point of
view. 197 A content-neutral regulation is subject to relaxed scrutiny, because
the regulation's main purpose is not to inhibit free expression of ideas, but
merely to protect public interests like privacy. 198 Content-neutral scrutinies
can be divided into two types: forum-based scrutinies, and combined speech
and conduct scrutinies.
L Forum Analysis: The Basic Test
The Supreme Court set forth the basic scrutiny for the constitutionality of
content-neutral regulations in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vin-
187. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
188. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
189. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
190. Id.
191. Id at 572.
192. For discussion of a recent case declaring certain speech outside of constitutional pro-
tection, see infra notes 319-29 and accompanying text.
193. See City Of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d. 18 (1989). Although
Dallas upheld a statute under rationality review that allegedly violated the right to freely asso-
ciate, rather than the right of free speech, the case illustrates the principle that any unprotected
expressive act is subject only to minimal due process scrutiny. See Tribe, supra note 29, at 791-
92.
194. Id. at 1594.
195. Id.
196. See infra notes 318-29 and accompanying text.
197. See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537.
198. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988).
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cent.199 The elements of the scrutiny require that: (1) the regulation must
further an important or substantial governmental interest; (2) the interest
must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (3) the inciden-
tal restriction on the protected speech must be no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. 2° ° For the first element, the Court's opin-
ions have ranged from requiring, at a minimum, that the interest be "clearly
adequate," 20 1 to an almost strict scrutiny, requiring that the interest be
"compelling. '20 2 Similarly, the third component ranges from a deferential
approach of rationality review20 3 to a requirement that the regulation target
the "exact evil." 2°4
The act of classifying the regulation as content-based or content-neutral
embodies the second inquiry, and this Comment discusses that aspect more
fully in the section devoted to inconsistencies in the macro scrutiny struc-
ture. 20 5 This section of the Comment, therefore, focuses only on the first
and third tests when analyzing the Court's decisions.
2. Forum Analysis: The Substantiality of the Governmental Interest
The Court in Taxpayers first required that a regulation further an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest.2°6 At times, the Court breaks the
requirement down further into two inquiries: first, does the regulation fur-
ther the asserted interest, and second, is the interest important or
substantial. 20 7
Few cases focus on the relationship between the regulation and the as-
serted interest. In Village ofSchaumberg v. Citizens20 the Court considered
a regulation prohibiting door-to-door solicitation by organizations that had
overhead costs of more than 25 percent of revenues. The Court struck down
the ordinance because, among other things, the regulation did not directly
advance the asserted interest in protecting citizens from fraud.2°9 Although
Schaumberg added this prong to the scrutiny, the Court failed to employ this
199. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
200. Id. at 805. The Taxpayers test actually includes a fourth element, requiring that the
government possess the constitutional power to enact the legislation. Id. at 805. A discussion
of the constitutional power of the government goes beyond the purpose of this paper.
201. Young, 427 U.S. at 52.
202. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
203. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989).
204. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988).
205. See infra notes 266-329 and accompanying text.
206. 466 U.S. at 805.
207. See Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens, 444 U.S. 620, 638-39 (1980). Arguably, the
requirement that the regulation further the asserted interest would fit under the analysis re-
garding the tailoring of the regulation.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 638. "The 75-percent requirement is related to the protection of privacy only in
the most indirect of ways." Id. Because the Court found that more effective means for fur-
thering the interest existed, the Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. Id. Arguably,
the Court was considering the direct effects of the regulation as a part of the scrutiny branch
which examines the necessity of the regulation.
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test in its most recent decisions.210 Thus, the regulation's furtherance of the
asserted interest does not appear to be a key weapon in the scrutiny arsenal,
but the test has not been explicitly abandoned.211
The most important part of forum scrutiny is the analysis of the substanti-
ality of the governmental interest. The Court, however, is inconsistent in
determining substantiality. 21 2 The Court has employed at least three meth-
ods of determining substantiality: first, a deferential conclusion that the in-
terest is "clearly adequate; '2 13 second, an analysis of the substantiality of the
interest which accounts for the forum in which the speech occurs; 2 14 and
third, an entirely different scrutiny dependent upon the forum
classification. 21 5
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 216 Detroit enacted an ordinance
which required adult theaters to disperse rather than concentrate in a single
area of the city. Noting that the analysis for time, place, and manner restric-
tions applied, 217 the Court found the regulation constitutional because the
City's interest in zoning was "clearly adequate" to support the limita-
tions.218 The ordinance treated adult theatres differently from other theatres
because of the content of the material shown in the adult theaters. While
such a content-based restriction would normally mandate content-based
strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the ordinance under the time, place and
manner scrutiny.219 In addition, the Court ignored the requirement that the
restrictions on free speech be no more restrictive than necessary. In short,
the Court reduced the scrutiny to one step, requiring only that the govern-
mental interest be adequate rather than substantial.220
210. See Taxpayers, 466 U.S. 789; Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
211. See Schaumberg, 444 U.S. at 638-39.
212. See infra notes 216-37 and accompanying text.
213. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 63.
214. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650-51.
215. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
216. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
217. Id. at 63 n.18.
218. Id at 63.
219. Id. In fact, the Young Court spoke of the regulation as if applying the content-based
scrutiny:
In short, apart from the fact that the ordinances treat adult theaters differently
from other theaters and the fact that the classification is predicated on the con-
tent of material shown in the respective theaters, the regulation of the place
where such films may be exhibited does not offend the First Amendment.
Id. at 62.
220. The Court made no attempt to hide its feeling that pornographic speech deserves less
constitutional protection than political speech.
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to
despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend
the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Ac-
tivities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though the First Amend-
ment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that
the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis from
placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.
Id. at 70-71. See also id. at 71 ("... what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limita-
tion on the place where adult films may be exhibited... "), and id. at 71 n. 35: ("The situation
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Another method of weighing the substantiality of the governmental inter-
est is to assess it in light of the forum involved. 22 1 In Heffron v. Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness222 the Court examined a statute
requiring that solicitation be conducted only from specified locations on the
Minnesota state fairgrounds. The Court found that Minnesota's interest in
controlling crowds at the state fair was substantial enough to warrant the
regulation, especially in light of the fact that the fair was a limited public
forum with limited purposes.223 The Krishnas, therefore, could not dis-
tribute literature and flowers in their traditional manner. This rather amor-
phous method of "considering" the forum when evaluating the substantiality
of the government interest obviously allows the Court to achieve a desired
outcome by placing different emphases on the forum in different cases. 224
Sometimes the Court commits to applying entirely different scrutinies to
the regulation after making a determination of the nature of the relevant
forum. 225 For example, in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund 226 Justice O'Connor set forth two distinct levels of governmental
interest linked to the three possible types of forums.227 When traditional
public forums are involved, the asserted interest must be compelling. 228
Similarly, when the government has designated a property as a public forum
the asserted interest must be compelling. 229 If the forum is non-public, how-
ever, the Court deflates the substantial interest test to a mere requirement
that the regulation be reasonable. 230
As a result of this approach, the label that the Court attaches to the forum
becomes outcome determinative. 23' Few would dispute that the burden of
proving reasonability of the regulation is much less onerous for the govern-
ment than proving a compelling interest. 232 In fact, under this method of
analysis, the Court undoubtedly has stretched to find a forum that permits
application of the desired test. 233
For example, in Cornelius, the NAACP wished to solicit contributions
would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting
access to, lawful speech"). The Young Court inferred that the speech was illegal, although
protected by the Constitution. See id. The Court was in no way ambivalent about the con-
temptuously low level of constitutional protection afforded pornography. Id. at 71, n. 35.
221. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 651-54
(1976).
222. 452 U.S. 640 (1976).
223. Id. at 651-54.
224. See Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at 813, wherein the Court in dicta addressed the forum analy-
sis long after the Court found the interest substantial.
225. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
226. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
227. Id. at 800-01.
228. Id. at 800.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. By applying varying levels of scrutiny based on the type of forum, the Court makes it
easier or more difficult for the regulation to pass scrutiny. See supra notes 94-144, 188-96 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the strict scrutiny and reasonability tests.
232. See supra notes 94-144, 188-96 for a discussion of the strict scrutiny and reasonability
tests.
233. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
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from federal employees by means of a federal employees' newsletter designed
to promote charitable contributions. The regulation at issue specifically pro-
hibited legal defense funds from using the newsletter, and therefore barred
the NAACP. Rather than deciding that the federal workplace was the rele-
vant forum, the Court determined that the forum was the newsletter and, as
such, was non-public.234 This reasoning allowed the Court to apply the rea-
sonability test rather than the compelling interest test.235
Clearly, the Court has wide discretion in determining whether a govern-
mental interest is substantial. 236 The Court has employed this discretion to
achieve vastly different results under the guise of a single scrutiny, thereby
eroding the principle of equality.237
3. Forum Analysis: No Greater Than Necessary
In Taxpayers the Court required that the effect of a regulation on pro-
tected speech be no greater than necessary. 238 The Court has used at least
three inconsistent techniques in evaluating the effect of the regulation.239
First, the Court has equated this test to a requirement that the regulation
be narrowly tailored to achieve the desired interest. 24° In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism 241 the Court faced a regulation requiring that performers
who used New York's Central Park employ the equipment and services of
the City in their productions. In holding that the regulation was a reason-
able time, place, and manner restriction, the Court noted that the require-
ment of narrow tailoring did not imply a least restrictive means analysis. 242
Instead, the Court concluded that it should defer to the decisionmaker's
judgment concerning whether the regulation was narrowly tailored, as long
as the regulation was reasonably related to the asserted governmental inter-
est.243 This time, therefore, the Court adopted a quite lenient test to deter-
mine whether the effects of the regulation were no more burdensome than
necessary.244
234. Id
235. Id at 800-06. Similarly, in Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983), the Court placed the label of non-public forum on teachers' mailboxes and
used the reasonability test to assess the constitutionality of an agreement between the school
district and the Perry Local Educator's Association which allowed only that association to use
the mailboxes. Id. at 48-49. The test of a designated public forum is whether the government
has opened it to the public. Id. at 45. Even though the Court found that the mailboxes had
been opened to the public occasionally, it designated it as a private forum. Id. at 46.
236. See supra notes 206-35 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 206-35 and accompanying text.
238. 466 U.S. at 806.
239. See infra notes 240-57 and accompanying text.
240. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 486 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). In Clark,
the Court restated the Taxpayers scrutiny as follows: "[the restrictions] are narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest, and.., they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information." Id. The addition of the alternative channels test is
discussed infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
241. 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989).
242. 109 S.Ct. at 2757.




In contrast, the Court in Frisby v. Schultz245 set forth an entirely different
standard to evaluate whether the regulation was narrowly tailored, or no
more restrictive than necessary. 246 In Schultz, anti-abortionists challenged
an ordinance that prohibited picketing near individual residences. The
Court held that in order to be narrowly tailored, a statute must target and
eliminate no more than the exact "evil" the statute attempts to remedy. 24 7
Even though the regulation survived scrutiny by virtue of the Court's crea-
tive interpretation, 248 this narrow tailoring test undoubtedly restricts regula-
tion more than the Ward test.249
In a completely different light, the Court sometimes interprets this branch
of analysis to require that an alternative means of communication exist.2 50
Often, the requirement of alternative means of communications seems to be
an entirely separate requirement. 251 Clearly, a regulation would have more
difficulty meeting the narrowly tailored test and satisfying the alternative
means criterion, than the regulation would have merely passing the no more
restrictive than necessary test.
In conclusion, the scrutiny for valid time, place and manner restrictions is
quite ambiguous. 252 The component requiring that the regulation further a
substantial governmental interest ranges from the clearly adequate test set
forth in Young 253 to the compelling interest required for public forums in
Cornelius.254 Similarly, the component requiring that the regulation be no
more burdensome than necessary ranges from the deferential approach of
rationality review taken in Ward255 to the precise evil test set forth in
Frisby.256 The Court appears willing to apply the specific factors necessary
to achieve any desired result in a given factual situation.257
E. Content-Neutral Scrutinies: Combined Speech and Conduct Scrutinies
Some regulations affect a combination of protected speech and conduct. 258
When a regulation limits the conduct but has incidental effects on the
speech, the Court analyzes the regulation under a more lenient scrutiny than
245. 108 S.Ct. 2495.
246. See id. at 2502.
247. Id
248. Id. at 2501. "Specifically, the use of the singular form of the words 'residence' and
'dwelling' suggests that the ordinance is intended to prohibit only picketing focused on, and
taking place in front of, a particular residence." Id. Apparently, the protesters could not be
prosecuted under the ordinance if they focused on one residential property at a time, and were
careful to let the protest lapse momentarily before moving to the next residence.
249. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
250. See Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at 812 ("the findings of the District Court indicate that there
are ample alternative modes of communication").
251. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 294; Ward, 109 S.Ct. at 2760.
252. See supra notes 199-251 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 199-251 and accompanying text.
258. See US. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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it uses for pure speech cases.2 59 In United States v. O'Brien 260 the Court set
forth the elements for this kind of scrutiny, which matches the forum-based
scrutiny set forth in Taxpayers.2
6 1
The Court has not articulated the speech/conduct scrutiny as inconsis-
tently as the forum-based scrutinies.262 Rather, the more lenient scrutiny the
Court uses for combined speech and conduct cases serves as an important
tool, enabling the Court to reach a desired holding.263 The Court quite eas-
ily finds conduct combined with speech and applies this lenient scrutiny,
thereby avoiding the strict scrutiny used for pure political speech. 264 This
Comment discusses these types of classification tricks and inconsistencies
discussed in depth in Section IV.2
6 5
IV. MACRO STRUCTURE INCONSISTENCIES
As explained in Section II, the Court employs a decision tree structure to
determine the scrutiny to apply to any given factual case where regulations
limit protected speech. 266 At each branch of the tree, the court must choose
which path to take, ultimately arriving at the desired scrutiny.267 Because
the methods of scrutiny are of various intensities, choosing a more lenient or
stricter scrutiny makes it easier or more difficult for the regulation to pass
the requirements. 2 68 Thus, in order to achieve the desired ruling on the reg-
ulation at bar, the Court could choose to classify the regulation in a manner
that allows the Court to apply the scrutiny that will support the desired
result. 269
The cases demonstrate that the Court inconsistently classifies similar regu-
lations.270 These inconsistencies, as a practical matter, allow the Court to
apply the scrutiny that justifies the desired results.271 The inconsistencies
are of three basic types: substituting forum-based scrutinies for noncommer-
cial speech scrutiny; 272 applying the combined speech and conduct scrutiny
instead of content-based scrutiny;273 and declaring speech outside the realm
of constitutional protection. 274
A. Noncommercial versus Forum Scrutinies
Recall that the basic noncommercial scrutiny requires that the govern-
259. See infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
260. 391 U.S. 367.
261. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 199-257 and accompanying text.
263. See TRIBE, supra note 29, at 827.
264. Id.
265. See infra notes 266-329 and accompanying text.
266. See supra page 1019 for a discussion of the decision tree.
267. Id.
268. See supra section III for a discussion of the various levels of scrutiny.
269. See id.
270. See infra notes 275-329 and accompanying text.
271. Id.
272. See infra notes 275-98 and accompanying text
273. See infra notes 299-317 and accompanying text.
274. See infra notes 318-29 and accompanying text.
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ment precisely tailor a regulation to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est.27 5 Contrast that analysis with the basic forum scrutiny, which requires
that: (1) the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; (2) the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and (3) the incidental restriction on the protected speech is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.276 Clearly, the forum scrutiny
demands less than the noncommercial speech scrutiny: the interest must
only be substantial, rather than compelling, and the method of serving that
interest must be something less than the least restrictive means required for
noncommercial scrutiny.
The Court must first classify the regulation as content-based or content-
neutral before applying either scrutiny. 277 If the Court classifies the regula-
tion as content-neutral, the regulation must pass the more lenient forum
scrutiny. 278 If the regulation is content-based, however, the Court uses the
strict noncommercial scrutiny.279
Sometimes the Court does not explicity classify the regulation before ap-
plying the scrutiny.28 0 In Metromedia28 1 the Court determined that a regu-
lation, banning both commercial and noncommercial billboards, was
content-based. 28 2 The concurrence, however, thought the regulation treated
all classes of speech more or less equally, and merely sought to regulate the
manner in which the speech occured. 28 3 The Court, after striking down the
ordinance for failing the content-based scrutinies, 28 4 classified the regulation
as content-based by delving deeply into the list of exceptions to the
regulation. 285
Alternatively, the Court engages in mere facial analysis of regulations to
decide content discrimination in cases like Taxpayers.28 6 Recall that the or-
dinance at issue banned the posting of signs on public property, a situation
very similar to the Metromedia regulation. 28 7 Even though this regulation
affected political speech more heavily than any other class of speech, 288 the
Court held that the regulation was content-neutral because the text was si-
lent concerning any speaker's point of view.28 9 In dissent, three Justices ar-
gued that the majority shouldn't so quickly accept the city's claim that the
275. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
277. See discussion of the decision tree structure, supra text page 1019.
278. See supra notes 199-257 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 94-144 and accompanying text.
280. See infra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
281. 453 U.S. 490.
282. Id. at 516.
283. See id. at 526-27 (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan adopted the time, place and
manner scrutiny. Id.
284. Id. at 515.
285. Id. at 516.
286. 466 U.S. 789.
287. 453 U.S. at 493.
288. Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at 823, 823 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 804. Compare the Taxpayers holding with Boos, in which the Court said that
content-based regulations include both those that prohibit viewpoints and those that exclude
an entire area of speech. Boos, 485 U.S. at 319.
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regulation was necessary to protect aestethic interests.290 The dissenters ar-
gued that especially when political speech is at issue, the Court should en-
gage in a more thorough analysis of the effects of the regulation, rather than
merely accept facial appearances. 291
Cornelius provides a third illustration of the variable depths of analysis the
Court gives this issue. 292 In Cornelius the government prohibited legal de-
fense funds and political advocacy groups from advertising in its charity
drive newsletter. After applying the forum analysis and deciding that the
regulation was constitutional, 293 the Court considered how the regulation
should have been classified. 294 Because the trial and appellate courts had
not made a finding on that issue, the Court refused to determine whether the
regulation was content-neutral. 295
These cases demonstrate that the Court manipulates its analysis of the
content-discriminatory effects of the regulation in order to apply the desired
scrutiny.296 In some cases, the Court engages in a lengthy analysis of the
regulation's effect on speech. 297 In others, the Court accepts the facial ap-
pearance of the statute.298 It becomes exceedingly difficult to predict which
factors the Court will apply in a particular case in order to justify its
decision.
B. Combined Speech and Conduct versus Content-Based Scrutinies
The second inconsistency in the macro scrutiny structure stems from the
substitution of the combined speech and conduct scrutiny for the content-
based scrutiny, which typically results in the application of a more lenient
scrutiny. 299 Tribe has commented on this phenomena, noting the relative
ease in finding conduct in almost all speech cases. 3°° He interprets the label
.of "speech plus conduct" to signify the Court's intention of announcing a
certain conclusion, rather than to embrace any stringent legal analysis.
301
In Texas v. Johnson,30 2 the Court struck down a Texas statute that pro-
hibited destruction of venerated objects.30 3 The Court based its holding on
the fact that Texas failed to assert an interest unrelated to the expressive
elements of the defendent's act of burning the American flag. 304 Texas as-
290. Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at 824.
291. Id. at 822-24.
292. 473 U.S. 788.
293. Id. at 811.
294. Id. at 812-13.
295. Id. The dissent would rule that the regulation impermissibly discriminates against
viewpoints and is therefore content-based. Id. at 834 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296. See supra notes 281-95 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 258-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of combined speech
and conduct scrutiny.
300. TRIBE, supra note 29, at 827.
301. Id.
302. 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342.
303. 109 S.Ct. at 2537.
304. Id. at 2543.
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serted that the statute was necessary to prevent disturbances of the peace
and to maintain the flag as a symbol of national unity. The Court performed
a lengthy analysis of these asserted interests, deciding that the breach of
peace interest was not implicated in the situation.305 In addition, the Court
found that the goal of preserving the flag as a symbol of unity was directly
related to Johnson's expressive conduct. 3°6 After a lengthy analysis of the
state's motive, the Court determined that the combined speech and conduct
scrutiny was unwarranted, and that the regulation must survive strict scru-
tiny.307 The Texas statute failed that test.308
In other cases, however, the Court has refused to engage in such in-depth
analysis of the state's asserted interest in regulating the non-expressive ele-
ments of conduct. 30 9 In United States v. O'Brien3 10 the Court upheld a fed-
eral statute prohibiting destruction of draft registration certificates. 311 The
defendant burned his certificate in protest of the draft. In holding the law
constitutional, the Court found that the state was merely attempting to reg-
ulate conduct unrelated to the expressive elements of such conduct. 312 The
Court determined that the statute was constitutional because the state pos-
sessed a vital interest in protecting the certificates from mutilation. 31 3 The
cards served as important proof that the individual actually registered for
the draft in case of a "mix-up" in the applicant's file.3 14
These cases demonstrate that the Court will go to great lengths to reach
the conclusion it desires.315 The Court's inconsistent classification of regula-
tions results in inequality of speech. 316 Similar regulations could survive the
more lenient scrutiny for combined speech and conduct, or fail the stricter
scrutiny for content-based regulations, depending on the Court's classifica-
tion.317 As a practical matter, such inconsistent classification renders the
system unlearnable, because it remains difficult to distinguish between con-
tent-based regulations and regulations affecting combined speech and.
conduct.
C Protected versus Unprotected Speech
The third inconsistency in the macro scrutiny structure stems from the
305. Id. at 2542.
306. Id at 2543.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 2548. Congress has recently passed a law prohibiting flag burning, hoping to
avoids the defects of the Texas law. 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (West Supp. 1990). Although the law
tried to avoid implicating the expressive elements of conduct, the Supreme Court held it un-
constitutional in U.S. v. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. 4744, 4745 (June 11, 1990)
309. See infra notes 310-14 and accompanying text.
310. 291 U.S. 367.
311. Id. at 382.
312. Id. at 378.
313. Id.
314. Id. The Court in O'Brien found the certificates important even though the certificates
contained only routine biographical information, easily duplicable. Id.
315. See supra notes 275-314 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 38-67 for a discussion of equality of speech and classification.
317. See supra notes 275-314 and accompanying text.
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Court's disturbing ability to declare speech outside the realm of First
Amendment protection. 318 Once speech falls outside the realm of protected
speech, the Court applies mere rationality review to any regulations affecting
such speech. 319
For example, in New York v. Ferber 320 the Court considered a New York
statute prohibiting the distribution of child pornography. The Court found
the statute to be constitutional because child pornography lies outside of
First Amendment protection.3 21 Although the Court had not previously de-
clared that child pornography merited no protection, the Court in Ferber
decided that child pornography lies outside First Amendment protection for
several reasons.322
First, the Court found that child pornography harms the physiological,
mental, and emotional health of children. 323 Second, the standard for deter-
mining what was legally obscene, and thus constitutionally unprotected, was
inadequate to address the current issue.324 Third, the value of child porno-
graphy was de minimiS.325 Finally, the act of declaring child pornography
unconstitutional was not inconsistent with previous decisions defining un-
protected speech. 326
Concededly, the low value of child pornography was probably an easy
"commonsense" call with which most people would agree.327 The dis-
turbing facet of Ferber lies not in the popularity of the decision, but its lack
of methodology. 328 The erosion of equality of speech becomes most appar-
ent when the Court abandons established methodology in favor of a mere
policy decision. 329
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Recommendations for the Macro Scrutiny Structure
The Court should retain the major classifications of noncommercial
speech, 330 commercial speech, 331 unprotected speech, 332 and forum analy-
318. See infra notes 320-29 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
320. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
321. Id. at 764.
322. Id. at 756-63.
323. Id. at 756-57.
324. Id. at 761.
325. Id. at 762.
326. Id. at 763.
327. For a discussion of the "commonsense" hierarchy of speech values, see supra notes 39-
42 and accompanying text.
328. See 485 U.S. at 756-63.
329. For a criticism of the ease in defining a new category of unprotected speech, see
Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 145-50 (1983).
330. For a discussion of noncommercial speech, see supra notes 94-144 and accompanying
text.
331. For a discussion of commercial speech, see supra notes 145-87 and accompanying
text.




sis. 333 The fifth category, speech plus conduct, should not be retained as a
category unless the Court can more clearly define its boundaries. Tribe criti-
cized this category, denouncing it as a label that justifies a conclusion rather
than a valuable tool for analysis. 334
First Amendment analysis requires the four major classifications 335 for
four reasons. First, these classifications promote learnability.336 People
more readily understand concepts that can be broken down into categories
for analysis. 337 Completely abandoning these classifications would probably
make the whole system even less learnable than it is currently.
Second, by promoting such understanding, the classifications help stem
the "chilling effect" of governmental regulation.338 By knowing how the
Court will likely treat a regulation, the public can gauge its effects. This
predictability will promote a rational reaction to governmental action, help-
ing to eradicate future turmoil such as the art community's reaction to the
Helms Amendment. 339
Third, these major classifications may actually help preserve the principles
of equality in First Amendment analysis. Were we to completely eliminate
these classifications, First Amendment analysis would be left with no cogent
structure. The resulting decisions would probably range from the inexplica-
ble to the bizarre. 34° Similar regulations would not necessarily be afforded
similar treatment, nor would the series of ad hoc decisions likely to emanate
from the courts protect speech acts equally.
Fourth, the Court has based too many decisions on these classifications to
completely abandon them. Such abandonment would put First Amendment
analysis at square one, depriving us of decades of First Amendment under-
standing. 341 Such total abandonment can only be justified when society
gains a radical new understanding of the meaning of freedom of speech, or in
those infrequent times when the Court doggedly enshrines a method of anal-
333. For a discussion of forum analysis see supra notes 199-257 and accompanying text.
334. TRIBE, supra note 29, at 827.
335. See supra notes 330-33.
336. For a discussion of the principles of learnability, see supra notes 30-32 and accompa-
nying text.
337. Id.
338. For a discussion of "chilling effects", see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
339. For a discussion of the Helms Amendment and the public's reaction, see supra notes
34-37 and accompanying text.
340. Indeed, Galloway suggests that the analysis is even now so vague and flexible that
judges are left at large to decide cases on the basis of personal bias, leaving scrutinies to "mere
after the fact rationalization for decisions made on the basis of economic and political preju-
dice." Galloway, supra note 70, at 487. Some semblance of structure helps to pin the judges to
legal analysis rather than personal bias.
341. Stephan defends the major categories on the merits. Stephan, supra note 25 at 213-14.
It is improvident to push the Court into such extreme choices, such as total equality for all
speech, because "[i]f the Court could not give lesser protection to categories of speech of only
moderate constitutional significance, it probably would be less inclined to honor the strategic
and pragmatic reasons for extending safeguards to speech intrinsically lacking in constitutional
value," resulting in less protection for most speech acts. Id. at 213. "That the Court may not
make the right distinctions, a fear that seems to underlie the criticism of categorical analysis,
does not mean that it should not attempt to do so." Id.
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ysis that is simply unworkable. 342
Although the Court should preserve these categories for the reasons out-
lined above, the system will still fail if the Court categorizes speech acts and
regulations inconsistently.3 43 First, the Court must cogently define the fac-
tors that differentiate one type of speech from another.3" Second, the Court
must apply the factors in a straightforward manner, rather than relegating
the whole analysis to the backwaters of the opinion after announcing a con-
clusion.345 First Amendment analysis, no matter how brilliantly designed,
will remain disjointed and unlearnable unless the Court courageously defines
terms and openly applies them.
B. Recommendations for the Micro Scrutiny Structure
A regulation restraining noncommercial speech should be a precisely
drawn means of serving a compelling state interest, as required in Consoli-
dated Edison.346 First, the regulation should be "precisely drawn" rather
than "narrowly tailored" to afford this most highly-valued speech the high-
est level of First Amendment protection available. 347 The Court should not
require that the regulation be the "least restrictive means" available, how-
ever, because that method of analysis has been selectively employed in the
past to announce the demise of the regulation when the Court can find no
other justification for its decision.348 In addition, "least restrictive means"
analysis proves very inexact in application. One can always think of means
that would be less restrictive than the ones employed, even though the alter-
natives may be ineffective or costly. 349 Such inexactness does nothing to
promote learnability of the system, nor does the least restrictive means anal-
ysis preserve equality when it is so selectively employed.
342. As an example of an unworkable course of analysis, see Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), recognized as one of the most misguided decisions in the history of the
Supreme Court. The dissent in Lochner criticized the majority for enshrining its own eco-
nomic values into the analysis of substantive due process. Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., dissenting). To
abandon the classification system entirely, would leave little analysis by which to decide First
Amendment cases other than the justices' personal views on what speech merited protection.
Galloway suggests that the Justices' personal views drive the decisions and the scrutiny
structure even now. Galloway, supra note 70, at 487. Galloway analogizes the current malaise
of constitutional scrutinies to the era of the four horsemen (Van DeVanter, McReynolds, Suth-
erland and Butler) where decisions were purportedly made on an ad hoc basis as the Justices
saw fit. Id.
343. See supra notes 272-329 and accompanying text.
344. A full discussion of the multitude of factors used to distinguish one class of speech
from another lies beyond the scope of this Comment, which concerns itself only with the use of
the classifications. The cases discussed supra notes 272-329 and accompanying text, demon-
strate, however, that the whole realm of classifying speech is an underdeveloped area of First
Amendment law.
345. Recall that the major flaw in the Court's classification of speech acts lies in the fleeting
attention the Court gives to the whole act of classification, relegating the analysis to the end of
the opinion, after announcing the conclusion. See supra notes 275-95 and accompanying text.
346. 447 U.S. at 540.
347. The Boos Court set forth the "narrowly tailored" requirement. 485 U.S. at 321.
348. See Sable Communications, 109 S.Ct. at 2838, 106 L.Ed.2d at 133-34. See supra notes
101-03 and accompanying text.
349. Examples of least restrictive means analysis can be found in other areas of constitu-
tional law, for example the dormant commerce clause cases. Tribe, supra note 29, at 438.
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Second, the Court must avoid pinning the constitutionality of a regulation
of noncommercial speech on the regulation's treatment of lower classes of
speech.350 By requiring that the regulation infringe more on lesser-valued
speech than noncommercial speech, the Court can declare a regulation un-
constitutional for failing to abridge enough speech. 35' Although such a scru-
tiny does promote equality of speech acts, equality is accomplished by
requiring not that all speech be protected equally, but infringed equally. This
cannot be the view of the First Amendment intended by either the framers
or the American population.
Finally, the Court must engage in some type of scrutiny in these cases.
The Court cannot fail to apply a standard, as in Texas v. Johnson,35 2 if the
Court wishes to uphold the principles of equality and learnability. The com-
plete lack of a scrutiny entitles the Court to justify or condemn the regula-
tion on whatever bases it wishes, clearly eroding the principle of equality.
The lack of an articulated scrutiny also renders the system unlearnable, for
the opinions without articulated scrutinies offer no guidance to lower courts
or to the populace.
For commercial speech regulations, the Court should require that the reg-
ulation directly advance a substantial governmental interest.353 When evalu-
ating the regulation, the Court should not wholly defer to the government's
assertions regarding the substantiality of its interests, as in Metromedia.35 4
Such deference to the legislature does not promote equality of speech, for it
allows the government to curtail particular speech that deserves protection
at the time and in the manner the legislature sees fit, leaving other forms
unregulated.
The Court should not adopt a test like that set forth in Posadas de Puerto
Rico,355 where the legislature's power to ban an activity necessarily includes
the lesser power to prohibit speech regarding the activity. 356 Very few com-
mercial matters lie outside the government's power of prohibition, 357 and
such a scrutiny would leave much commercial speech without protection.
350. The Court in Metromedia pinned the constitutionality of the regulation on the regula-
tion's treatment of lower classes of speech. 453 U.S. at 515. Hopefully, the Court will not
continue to use the Metromedia analysis. Even the Justices involved in the Metromedia plural-
ity disagreed heartily on the decision, as evidenced by the amount of space the plurality de-
voted to attacking the Chief Justice's dissent as "rhetorical hyperbole." See Metromedia, 453
U.S. at 517-21.
351. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 540-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
352. 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342. For a full discussion of the case, see supra notes
128-35 and accompanying text.
353. The Court first set forth the commercial scrutiny in Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
For a full discussion of Central Hudson, see supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text. The
Court in Board of Trustees, 109 S.Ct. at 3033, 106 L.Ed.2d at 403, apparently confirmed the
scrutiny, acknowledging that the scrutiny requires less than a least restrictive means analysis.
See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
354. 453 U.S. 490, 512.
355. 478 U.S. 328.
356. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
357. For many years the Court has accepted the power of the Legislature to regulate com-
mercial activity, under the Commerce Clause, with few barriers; because Congress possesses so
much power to regulate, Congress also possesses the power to prohibit advertising.
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This violates the principle of equality for the same reasons as does high def-
erence to the legislature: the government can pick and choose which speech
to regulate.
The Court sets forth two variants on how closely the commercial speech
regulation must fit the ends to be achieved: either the regulation must be no
more extensive than necessary, 358 which implies a least restrictive means
analysis, or the Court will allow a somewhat looser fit. 359 As discussed pre-
viously, the Court should not adopt the least restrictive means analysis.36°
Least restrictive means analysis would also blur the distinction between the
categories of commercial and noncommercial speech, thereby detracting
from the learnability of the system of analysis. The court should therefore
allow a looser fit between the means and end for commercial speech
regulations.
The Court should retain the scrutiny for content-neutral regulations set
forth in Taxpayers361 wherein the government must prove that the regula-
tion furthers a substantial interest and incidentally infringes upon speech no
more than necessary. 362 First, when analyzing the substantiality of the in-
terest, the Court should require that the regulation directly further that in-
terest. 363  Such a requirement parallels the scrutiny for noncommercial
speech, thus helping to promote equality of speech because the government
may not curtail one type of speech more easily than another. The Court also
should assess the substantiality of the governmental interest itself, rather
than deferring so heavily to the legislature, as in Young.364 Recall that the
Court emphasizes the forum in which the speech occurs when assessing sub-
stantiality.365 The Court should make the forum but one consideration un-
derlying a common scrutiny for these regulations, rather than the basis for
separate scrutinies. 366 Separate scrutinies erode the principles of equality
and learnability, because they further classify speech based on content and
complicate the scheme of analysis.
Second, when assessing the incidental impact on speech, the Court should
ask whether the speaker has alternative means of communication. 367 This
inquiry better addresses the issue than the very lenient deference of Ward 368
or the "exact evil" test of Frisby.369 Extreme lenience leaves too much
358. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
359. See Board of Trustees, 109 S.Ct. at 3033, 106 L.Ed.2d at 403. The Court failed to
specify what a lesser test might resemble. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
361. 466 U.S. 789.
362. Id. at 805.
363. Schaumberg, 444 U.S. 688. For a full discussion of Schaumberg, see supra notes 208-
10 and accompanying text.
364. 427 U.S. 50, 63. For a full discussion of Young, see supra notes 216-20 and accompa-
nying text.
365. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 651-54.
366. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. 800. For a full discussion of Cornelius, see supra notes 226-30
and accompanying text.
367. Taxpayers, 466 U.S. at 612.
368. 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661.
369. 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420.
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power to the legislature to treat speech unequally, and the "exact evil" test
detracts from learnability because one can always conceive of a more exact
regulation.370
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent Supreme Court decisions have created a system of subclassifica-
tions based on two types of inconsistencies: those stemming from inconsis-
tent enunciation of the scrutinies themselves, 371 and those stemming from
inconsistent decisions on how to classify speech. 372 Whenever the Court
treats equivalent speech acts differently due to inconsistencies in the case
law, the Court diminishes the principle of equality of speech. The inconsis-
tencies also render the entire system largely unlearnable. Finally, such incon-
sistencies tend to have a "chilling effect" on speech since the inconsistencies
tend to favor the regulation rather than the protected speech.
If the Court wishes to preserve the notion of equality, learnability, and the
freedom to speek one's mind, the Court must make substantial changes in
the scrutiny structure. The Court can avoid the serious erosion of the princi-
ples underlying the First Amendment by clarifying the individual scrutinies
and applying the scrutinies in a consistent manner. Only by avoiding the
further degeneration of the scrutiny system into subclassifications can the
Court preserve fundamental values.
370. Because the Court reviews unprotected speech under rationality review, the Comment
makes no recommendations since rationality review is a necessarily vague test. This Com-
ment, moreover, makes no recommendations regarding the combined speech plus conduct cat-
egory, as this Comment advocates the elimination of that category. See supra note 334 and
accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 92-265 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 266-329 and accompanying text.
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